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Abstract. The guaranteed reliable and uninterrupted supply of electrical 
energy to consumers is an important task. It can be noted that currently there 
is no well-structured system for ensuring reliability or security and prevent-
ing risk occurrence. In this report, risk assessment algorithms in case of ac-
cidents on transmission line are developed and tested by means of the ana-
lytical example. 
1 Introduction  
Reliability of consumer or consumer groups electricity supply is related to the technical state 
and operating conditions of external distribution networks, through which they are fed. 
Decreasing of reliability from transmission line faults leads to a shortage of electricity to 
consumers, which is called “damage from electricity sacrifice” in cash-equivalent term, thus 
the study of risks from transmission line faults is relevant. The problem of reliability and risk 
is discussed by Billington R., Allan R., Beehler M, Guk Yu.B., [2, 3, 6]. In addition to this, 
modern authors such as Syrri A.L.A., Mancarella P., Junlakarn S., Ciapessoni E., consider 
this problem in their articles [9, 8, 5]. 
Nowadays, requirements that regulate the risk assessment and reliability calculation are 
either absent or obsolete. Consequently, the utility practice requires the theory and methods 
for reliability calculation taking into account the risks from faults. 
2 What is Reliability? 
Reliability refers to reliability connected with electrical mode (henceforth referred to as reli-
ability) or service security. [7, 8] 
Generally, reliability is the ability of a power system to hold over a new state due to 
disturbances without violation of power system stability. It characterizes the emergency pro-
cedures by the criterion (n-i), where n − is the total number of components and i − is the 
number of suddenly disconnected system components [6]. 
                                                          
* Corresponding author: ava40@tpu.ru 
© The Authors, published by EDP Sciences. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
MATEC Web of Conferences 141, 01053 (2017) DOI: 10.1051/matecconf/201714101053
Smart Grids 2017
MATEC Web of Conferences 
 
Reliability of consumer energy supply can be defined as the difference between electrical 
supply with full consumer demand ( CW ) and electricity sacrifice due to accidents and other 
events ( W ) to CW  [4]: 
100CW
C
W W
Н %.
W

      (1) 
Service security is determined by the level of physical reliability of individual compo-
nents and component connection layout. 
The main indicators of service security are: 
‒ failure flow parameter [ω, failure per year] called SAIFI in [3] is the ratio of com-
ponent number that failed per a time unit to the total number of the same tested components; 
‒ recovery time [Tr, hour] − the ratio of total recovery time of technical devices for 
the selected fixed period to the number of its failures for the same fixed period. 
The main reliability indicators of systems with various connections of recoverable com-
ponents are calculated according to the serial and parallel connection of components [2]. 
3 Calculation of the damage from electricity sacrifice 
Estimation of the damage from electricity sacrifice costs can be calculated as 
0s sD d W ,       (2) 
where sW  is the expected load at the delivery point, kWh; 0d , is the specific cost for 
energy which is not supplied, $/kWh [1]. 
4 Risk Assessments from power supply interruption 
Qualitative analysis corresponds to the stage of risk identification, quantitative analysis al-
lows determining the size of individual risks numerically and risks in general. [9] 
4.1 Quantitative method 
The calculation of this indicator is carried out by the assumption that production costs can be 
divided into conditionally variable Ccon−var (depending on the volume of production Bp) and 
conditionally constant Ccon−fix (independent of the volume of production). 
100con fixcr
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    (3) 
where Vcr − the critical volume of transferred electricity, %. 
To calculate the break-even point, the planning interval, for example, the year is chosen 
and full production capacity is achieved. The project is considered sustainable if Vcr <75 - 
80% from normal level. Advantages of calculation of the break-even point are the simplicity 
and clarity. [5] 
4.2 Qualitative method 
For a qualitative risk assessment of electricity supply, it is necessary to determine the main 
components of the risk and the severity of fault consequences (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Scales for establishing the severity category of failure consequences. 
 
Severity category 
of failure conse-
quences 
Severity characteristics of failure consequences 
IV-catastrophic 
failure 
The failure, which rapidly and with high probability can cause significant damage 
to the object and / or the environment, death or serious injuries of people, failure 
of the task 
III-critical failure 
The failure, which rapidly and with high probability can cause significant damage 
to the facility itself and/or the environment, disrupts the task, but creates a negli-
gible threat to life and health of people 
II-not critical 
failure 
The failure that leads to delaying in the fulfillment of the task, decreasing the 
readiness and efficiency of facilities, but does not pose a threat to the environment, 
facilities themselves and human health 
I-with small 
consequences 
The failure, which leads to decreasing the quality of the function of facilities, does 
not pose a threat to the environment and human health 
To perform this type of analysis, each type of failure must be assigned. The level of oc-
currence probability is illustrated in Table 2. 
Table 2. Levels of occurrence probability. 
 
Level probability 
of failure Description Analysis 
A Frequent failure. The probability of failure exceeds 0.2 
In-depth quantitative analysis of 
criticality is required 
B Probable failure. The probability of failure from 0.1 to 0.2 
Quantitative analysis of criticality 
is desirable 
C Possible failure. The probability of failure from 0.01 to 0.1 
Only qualitative analysis is re-
quired 
D Rare failure. The probability of failure is from 0.001 to 0.01 Analysis is not required 
E Remote failure. The probability of failure during a given time is below 0.001 Analysis is not required 
The procedure for qualitative analysis of criticality consists of assigning priorities for 
corrective and compensative actions to the types of failures, depending on the failure cate-
gory and given level of failure probability. 
Types of failures are distributed according to the criticality schedule, where on the hori-
zontal axis the values of failure categories are shown, and on the vertical axis the failure 
probability levels are illustrated (Figure 1). 
failure
probability
level
failure
category
I II III IV  
Fig. 1. Characteristics of the severity of failure consequences in a power supply system. 
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According to the schedule in Figure 1, areas of equal priorities are singled out: 
1 − high. A component whose failure requires special attention in the design. 
2 − medium. A component whose failures require attention during development. 
3 − low. A component that requires careful analysis of species, consequences and criticality 
of failures to confirm priority values. 
The advantage of qualitative analysis is that it is performed in early stages of develop-
ment, when the design of products is not fully defined and there is no quantitative data on 
reliability of all components; as a result, it is simple and evident. 
5 Calculation of practical objectives 
The problem situation: The plant is fed from two power sources: CHPP (Combined Heat and 
Power Plant) and System (Figure 2). Each transmission line can transfer total power required 
by the plant. However, CHPP can not produce more than 15.5 MW. Parameters are conven-
tionally accepted and given in Table 3. 
Load
22B21B
12B11B 1l
2l
System
CHPP
=30 MWLP
80 km
30 km
 
Fig. 2. Scheme of the power supply system. 
The task is to define parameters of the failure flow in this system, the probability of fail-
ure, damage from the electricity sacrifice in a year, and then identify the risks. 
Given: Vnom=110 kV. 
Lines: r0=0.118 Om, l1=80 km, l2=30 km. 
Load: cos 0.9 , Pl=30 MWh. 
 
Table 3. Power Transmission Reliability Parameters. 
 
 
Indicators of  
reliability 
System component 
11B  l1 12B  21B  l2 22B  
0 ,1/(km per year) - 0.051 - - 0.051 - 
 , 1/year 0.02 - 0.02 0.02 - 0.02 
rТ , hour 7 8 20 20 7 20 
 
It is assumed that unintentional disconnections of series-connected circuit components 
are combined in time. 
Calculations: 
Probability of failure for circuits I and II: 
11 11 1 1 21 21
3
0 1 (0.02 7 0.051 80 8 0.02 7) / 8760 3.78 10 ;I B rB l rl B rBТ l Т Тq
                   
21 21 2 2 22 22
3
0 2 (0.02 7 0.051 30 8 0.02 7) / 8760 1.437 10 .II B rB l rl B rBТ l Т Тq   
                 
Failure can be classified as category III i.e. the critical failure. The probability of failure 
of all components is defined separately. 
11 12 21 22 11 11
0.02 7 / 8760 0.00002B B B B B ВBТq q q q         ; 
1 1 1
0.051 80 8 / 8760 0.004l l rlТq       ; 
2 2 2
0.051 30 8 / 8760 0.0014l l rlТq       . 
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Based on these calculations, the breakers can be assigned for group E, transmission lines 
for group D, therefore, no analysis is required for the components. Comparing the obtained 
data according to the graph, shown in Figure 1, it can be concluded that all considered com-
ponents of the system belong to the second priority of the component classification and it is 
not necessary to enter control systems and compensate the failure. 
In the steady-state mode the risk assessment is defined by quantitative method (break-
even point) from the electricity sacrifice. 
Total investment: 1921000I  $. 
Conditional-fixed costs: Ccon−fix=94090 $. 
Conditional-variable costs: 
Ccon−var= 38100 10 0.013 108100год transW T      $, 
where transT – tariff for electricity transmission, $/kWh; 
W  – losses of energy per year, kWh. 
The volume of production: 
330 10 8760 0.013 3508000р year transВ W T       $. 
Breakeven point: 
94090
3508000 1081
10
00
0 100 2 78con fixcr
р con var
C
V % % . %
В C


    
 
. 
The scheme is reliable since Vcr <75 - 80% from the normal level. 
When an accident on transmission line occurs the risk assessment is calculated by quan-
titative method. 
30 15100 100 50
30
C
W
C
W W
Н % % %
W
 
     . 
Taking into account the average recovery time of the line, the estimated damage from 
electricity sacrifice costs: 
3
0 0 313 15 8 10 37720s sD d W .        $. 
The proceeds from the sale of products are changed 
' 350800 377200 3470000sр р DВ В    $. 
Break-even point: 
94090
3470000 10810
1
0
00 100 3con fixcr
con vр ar
C
V %
В'
% %
C


    
 
. 
Based on the calculation results, it can be noticed that the critical sale volume when one 
line is out of service has slightly increased, the project is remaining reliable. 
6 The total algorithm of risk assessment 
Based on the analytical problem solution, the algorithm is developed taking into account risks 
from accidents on transmission lines: 
1. Visually determine the sections of the circuit with weak circuit reliability. 
2. Modeling electric modes that detect “narrow” places by regime reliability, capturing areas 
with weak circuit reliability. 
3. Define reliability indicators. 
4. Determine the probability of failure. 
5. Determine the damage from under-supply of electrical energy. 
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6. Range failure by category: with small consequences, no critical failure, and critical fail-
ure. To determine the method of risk research depending on the category. 
7. Identify risk by quantitative and/or qualitative method. 
8. Compare the damage from the electricity sacrifice with investments for measures to im-
prove reliability. 
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